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I. INTRODUCTION

In Eastern Europe, the collapse of Communism created an opportunity for the
victims of one failed utopian ideology to find another. It did not take them very
long.
The evaporating Soviet armies and their local apparatchiks left an ideological
vacuum that was quickly filled by a remarkable outpouring of ideas on how to
spread Western-style capitalism into the former Second World. Legions of
Western advisers arrived in the wake of the departing Soviet troops to translate
the goals of political democracy and a market economy into an action agenda.
Democracy translated quickly into elections, a market economy into privatization.
As in many hurried translations, the bare essentials were grasped, but much
was missed. Elections are essential to democracy, but functioning democracies are
built on much more than just elections-even fair and honest ones. And private
ownership, especially share ownership of large companies, is but one element of
a modem market economy.
The exciting and relatively straightforward questions-how, and how quickly,
to privatize state assets and to free trade--dominated discussion, both within
Eastern Europe and in the growing ranks of Western advisers, consultants, commentators, and fortune seekers. Privatization, in particular, assumed special
significance. The conventional wisdom was that Communist firms produced inappropriate, low quality goods at exorbitant costs because state ownership of industry distorted managerial and worker incentives. The generally poor performance
of state industries throughout the Third World reinforced the impression that the
state and the market do not mix. The main objective of Eastern European
economic planners and their Western advisers became "getting the state out."
The fate of small enterprises like shops, restaurants, small landholding, or
farms was never at issue. Everyone agreed that small-scale privatization should
take place expeditiously. Putting small business in the hands of self-interested
private citizens--"the natural owners"--seemed the best way to energize private
sector growth, especially in service-related industries. Encouraging small-scale,
private ownership also appeared likely to aid the growth of an entrepreneurial
class and a capitalist ethic. It was Schumpeter, after all, who explained that it is
the active small capitalist, the artisan, the proprietor, and not the renter or petty
shareholder, who will go to the barricades to defend his property and the system
that gives it value to him.' And in Eastern Europe, common sense dictated that
the new system would need all the avid supporters it could get, and it would need
them quickly. The early returns on these hypotheses have been promising. Spurred
on by liberal small privatization laws and by the spontaneous opening of new

1.

JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY pt. I (3d ed. 1947).
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Poland and Hungary, has experienced a
enterprises, Eastern Europe, especially
2
activity.
business
small
in
boom
It was the fate of the huge and uncompetitive enterprises employing thousands
of workers that posed the troubling dilemma.3 Ideally, in the spirit of radical
reform, these relics of a failed era should be condemned and closed. They would
then be replaced by lean, competitive firms, not necessarily in the same product
lines, but better aligned with each country's revealed comparative advantage.
Social and political reality, however, made this choice quite impossible. What
were the options?
Most experts considered only one alternative: privatization. The ensuing
debates were limited to second-tier issues: Namely, how to transfer assets to the
private sector? Which assets should be privatized? Who-foreigners, corporations,
ex-Communists, ethnic groups, black marketeers, or former owners-should be
allowed to obtain assets? How fast privatization should take place? But nobody
ever questioned whether privatization should occur.4
Of those issues, the "how fast" question assumed pivotal importance. In many
eyes, especially Western ones, delay presented the potential risk that the
individuals or groups who stood to lose the most during privatization (i.e., old

For an extensive discussion of new, small business activity, including 1991 data, in Hungary, the
2.
former Czechoslovakia, and Poland, see Simon Johnson, Private Business in Eastern Europe, Paper presented
in Cambridge, Mass. at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.'s Conference in Eastern Europe (Feb.
26-29, 1992). For*a focus on entrepreneurial activity in the nations of the former Czechoslovakia, see Judith
Brandsma, Entrepreneurial Development in Czechoslovakia, Paper presented at the OECD's Conference on
Training for Entrepreneurship in Prague, Hungary (Oct. 10, 1991).
3.
Hughes and Hare calculated that in 1991, taking into account the poor quality of Eastern European
products, manufacturing in the former Czechoslovakia produced a negative value-added share of 34%, in
Hungary 35.5%, and in Poland 38.9%. Sanjay Dhar, Public Enterprise Restructuring: Achilles' Heel of the
Reform Process, TRANSITION, Mar. 1992, at 6, 6-8 (citing "Competitiveness and Industrial Restructuring in
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland").
A cottage industry has grown up around privatization in Eastern Europe. The contours of the debate
4.
can be captured in the following selections: RONALD 1. McKINNON, THE ORDER OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION:
FINANCIAL CONTROL IN THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY (1991); JA'NOs KORNAI, THE ROAD TO A

FREE ECONOMY (1990); Manuel Hinds, Issues in the Introduction of Market Forces in Eastern European
Socialist Economies, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPER, Apr. 1990 [hereinafter Hinds, Market Forces];Manuel
Hinds & Gerhard Pohl, Going to Market: Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, Paper presented at the
World BanklTreuhandanstaltSeminar on Privatization in East Germany and Eastern Europe in Berlin, Germany
(May 6-7, 1991); OLIVER BLANCHARD ET AL., REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE (1991); David Ellerman et al.,
PrivatizationControversiesEast and West, in 3 COMMUNIST ECONOMIES AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION No.
3, at 283, 283-298 (1991); Horst Kern & Charles F. Sable, Between Pillar and Post: Reflections on the
Treuhand's Uncertainty About What to Say Next, Presented at Conference on the Treuhandanstaltat Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 1991); David Stark, Privatizationin Hungary: FromPlan to Market orfrom
Plan to Clan?,4 E. EUR. POL AND SOCIETIES No. 3, at 351, 351-92 (1990); David Stark, Path Dependence and
PrivatizationStrategies in East Europe, 6 E. EUR. POL. AND SOCIETIES No. 1, at 17, 17-51 (1992) [hereinafter
Stark, Path Dependence].
For a discussion of reprivatization in Eastern Europe, see Andrew Schwartz & Laura D'Andrea Tyson,

Reprivatizationin Eastern Europe: RoundtableReport, in ANDREA BOHM & VLADIMIR KREACIC, REPRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: COUNTRY PRIVATIZATION REPORTS AND SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION
ISSUES (1992).
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line bureaucrats, and the managers and workers of state enterprises) would
undermine the privatization process, thereby jeopardizing the transition to a
market economy.5 According to Jeffrey Sachs:

[T]he need to accelerate privatization in Eastern Europe is the paramount
economic policy issue facing the region. If there is no breakthrough in
privatization in large enterprises in the near future the entire process
could be stalled for political and social reasons for years to come, with
dire consequences for the reforming economies of the region.6
The Economist agreed, calling "the growing acceptance of ...gradualism ...the
greatest peril now facing the countries of Eastern Europe."7
As those favoring rapid privatization expected, a school of "gradualists" did
emerge to advocate slower methods of privatization.8 The gradualists contended
that the short-run costs of rapid privatization would overwhelm any conceivable
long-term benefit. Long accustomed to the protection of the state, the newly
privatized companies would not be able to survive in a competitive market
environment. The structures of both supply and demand for these large firms had
been shattered; the industrial linkages between Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet republics were severed. Politics suddenly separated firms from their
customers just as the movement of rivers into new channels left medieval
entrep6ts high and dry on silted streams. Corporate failings resulting from sudden
privatization would cause extensive layoffs, massive bankruptcies, and ultimately,
social unrest. In a climate of chaos, the state would eventually have to support the
failing enterprises in one way or another.
Structure alone dictated an active economic role for the state. A heritage of
monopoly structures would mean a future of regulation. Who would regulate
monopoly and oligopoly industries? Who would oversee the subsidization of the
loser, and the reemployment of masses of workers? Who would oversee
international trade and economize foreign exchange, functions that Western
European governments found they had to do after World War II?
One could add to this prudent litany that private owners could not operate
alone in an environment of open trade. The experience of East German industries,

See Schwartz & Tyson, supra note 4.
5.
6.
Jeffrey Sachs, Accelerating Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, Paper presented at
the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics (Apr. 25-26, 1991).
Survey of Business in Eastern Europe, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991, at 5.
7.
8.
The dichotomy between radical capitalists and gradualists oversimplifies the debate somewhat, though
the thrust of the argument remains intact. For instance, Ost divides the gradualists into two factions. One, the
Populist critique aims to minimize the social costs of privatization by warning that quick integration of Eastern
Europe into the world economy increases the likelihood that the region will be pauper, not equal to the West.
Two, the social democratic (usually consisting of ex-Communists) approach, emphasizes the importance of
worker participation in transforming corporate ownership, noting the rise of post-Fordist techniques of
production. David Ost, The Crisis of Liberalism in Poland, TELOS, Fall 1991, at 85, 93.
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the best of the Eastern European bunch, provides a chilling example; they
immediately and completely lost their home market to goods from West Germany.
Sooner or later, and probably sooner, the government would have to limit or at
least filter imports.
Finally, gradualists argued that the absence of credible capitalist or democratic
institutions exacerbated the risks of rapid privatization. Essential preconditions for
modern capitalist economies, such as an established legal system or tax code,
financial institutions, and effective capital markets, did not yet exist. These
shortcomings increased the odds that a "big bang in ownership" would turn into
a "big bust."
Could the fragile democratic governments of the region cope with the fallout
from widespread company closings? Probably not, argue the gradualists. Privatization's short-run risks would threaten a political backlash endangering not only the
economic transformation process but also the future-of democracy in the region.
For their part, the advocates of rapid privatization, or "radical capitalists,"
generally concede the short-run risks, but contend that the long-run requisites for
economic development-for example, private ownership-outweigh short-term
expediencies.
Basic questions about the significance of private ownership underlie the
debate between the gradualists and radical capitalists. Is private ownership of
large enterprises, as its champions proclaim, essential for economic development?
In the absence of credible market institutions, is private ownership likely to
provide the necessary incentives for manufacturing innovation and efficiency to
enable the former Communist countries to compete in world markets? Only by
evaluating the impact of different ownership structures can one evaluate rapid
privatization's short-run risks.
This article supports the gradualist position in Eastern Europe by questioning
the tight linkage assumed between private ownership of big enterprises and
economic growth both in general and within the region. The discussion
incorporates four claims:
(1) Privatizing ownership will not, by itself, make large, uncompetitive firms
operate efficiently and creatively. Private ownership makes sense only in
the context of already established capitalist firms-firms that do not yet
exist in Eastern Europe. The fundamental challenge for would-be Eastern
European capitalists is the creation of competitive market firms from .the
state enterprises of the command economies, a process which will not
occur quickly or painlessly. Large capitalist firms need expertise in
pricing, accounting, legal matters, marketing, and advertising, in addition
to the establishment of productivity incentives. In conjunction with the
establishment of private, active ownership must come the creation of
firms. Moreover, firms do not exist in an institutional vacuum. The
character and eventual success of capitalist firms relies on domestic, and
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sometimes, international, structures of law, finance, regulation, and
industry. Private ownership, even in the Western context, can be
meaningfully considered only in the context of embedded socioeconomic
institutions.
(2) Eastern Europe is an unsuitable candidate for rapid privatization because
of its minimal recent experience with capitalism and because critical
linkages between firms, between suppliers and users, and between firms
and their traditional markets, have been politically severed. Re-creating
such international networks will take substantial time; these nations are
too small to substitute domestic linkages for them. It will also take time
to build complementary political and economic institutions, including the
development of a "capitalist ethos." Erecting a system of domestic
finance with efficient capital markets is but one important example of
such needed institutions. Absent international industrial networks and
those supporting socioeconomic institutions, large-scale privatizations will
not produce viable private firms.
(3) The state will play the major role in industrial development in Eastern
Europe and will remain the primary owner of large industrial assets
regardless of the chosen privatization strategy. The vulnerability of state
industry allows no other alternative. Nonetheless, the choice of a
privatization strategy is significant in determining the precise role that the
state will play.
(4) There are reasonable alternatives to simple private ownership of Eastern
European large enterprises which should be explored. The creation of an
honest and effective public administration-not the privatization of
uncompetitive giant firms-is the key step toward the creation of a
successful capitalistic market system and a functioning democracy in
Eastern Europe.
II. OWNERSHIP AS IDEOLOGYOWNERSHIP AS INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY

Capitalism entered Eastern Europe to fill an ideological void. Mostly it was
fundamentalist capitalism that poured in-the universal solution that all could
understand: free prices, free trade, and privatization. It was simple and intense;
a formula for action when fast and fundamental action was clearly needed. It
quickly assumed the contours of the intellectually and emotionally empty space
that it filled; it became an ideology. In the former Czechoslovakia, the observation
that "'the leading role of the market' has simply been substituted wholesale for
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what was once 'the leading role of the party"' 9 captured the ideological role the
new thinking assumed. Yet, like the ideology that preceded it, capitalism in its
idealized form-with pure prices, free trade, and private owners-makes more
sense as myth than as reality, myth in the Sorelian sense of the term: "A vague
association of motivating images."'10
In spreading their gospel of economic progress, radical capitalists oversimplify
notions of private ownership, as well as pure trade and free trade, and pay insufficient attention to the integrated development of institutions in specific states and
times; radical capitalists neglect history. Only "economic theory" enters the stage.
This was, in part, due to the simple fact that most of these advisers are young and
know little history, but are quite good with economic models. It is also due to the
fact that any remotely appropriate historical experience, such as Europe after
World Wars I and II, pointed in a quite different direction.
Radical capitalists insist that only a system of privately owned firms linked
together by markets provides the right incentives and the right constraints, a set
of signals that compel and restrain action that are all aligned towards social
dynamism and allocative optimality. Moreover, market signals are prompt and
unrelenting. Adaptation is fast and permanent. Planning systems are cumbersome
and slow, adaptation is slow and uncertain." For that reason, as well as the
dynamics of selection under such a system,' 2 private owners may be better
managers than the state.
Private firms are also much more likely to be innovative and to increase
efficiency given incentives derived from profit maximization rather than plan
fulfillment; companies that do not produce quality products at competitive prices
go out of business in market economies. Also, private owners have a stake in
choosing the most efficient allocation of capital, whereas the state planner may
have other motivations, such as maximizing employment or encouraging the
development of an industrial sector that may be uncompetitive on world markets.
One of the impressive aesthetics of capitalism is the perfect match between efficiency in capital formation and efficiency in production. 3 Moreover, newly privatized industries are likely to attract foreign investors-the main sources of modem
technology and management skills-more readily than state counterparts. Finally,
the competition induced from privatization might eventually result in the down-

9.

Stephen Engelberg, East Bloc Treading Water in a Sinkhole of Lethargy, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1992,

at Al, A16.
10. GEORGES SOREL, REFLECIONS ON VIOLENCE (1912).
11.
See generally SCHUMPETER, supra note 1.
12.
Id.
13.
For a transaction-cost analysis relating the structure of ownership with investment incentives in
Eastern Europe, see Oliver Williamson, Private Ownership and the Capital Market, Paper presented at the Kiel
Institute of World Economics' Conference on Privatization (Sept. 9-10, 1991). Supporting privatization,
Williamson argues that "all assets, including capital, require an advocate, and private property is the only
'advocate for capital' that is both broadly-based and effective." Id. See Hinds, Market Forces, supra note 4.
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sizing of large, uneconomic monopolies into more productively sized companies.
At first glance, it is hard not to agree with the radical capitalists: private firms,
.even very big ones, are best, wherever and whenever.
There are two problems, however. First, simple-minded notions of private
ownership structures obscure issues of control and incentives in modem capitalist
economies. It is naive to reduce private ownership in modem industrial economies
to a set of entrepreneurs with the authority and skills to manage large corporations. In practice, modem private ownership is a complex web of rights,
obligations, warrants, leasing agreements, and shares. Actual control of a company
depends not only on the distribution of ownership, but on the specific corporate
structure. For instance, ownership in many large U.S. companies is divided among
shareholders owning preferred and common stock. Others may own convertible
bonds or warrants. Yet, the ability of one owner to influence corporate behavior
will differ from that of another depending on the rights conferred by a particular
security. For instance, in many cases preferred shareholders may not vote at
shareholder meetings, while most common shareholders can. Both categories of
shareholders are considered owners. Sometimes, even major shareholders of
voting stock cannot influence corporate policy, as many U.S. investors discovered
in the'1980s to their chagrin. At that time, some management teams opted to
swallow excessive debt ("poison pills") to block takeover attempts that would
have netted the shareholders big returns, but would have cost managers their jobs.
At other times, owners of firms, especially those with large debt obligations, may
share or perhaps cede control to financiers.1 4 Evidence of corporate behavior
derived from complex ownership structures already is appearing in Eastern
Europe. In contemporary Hungary, David Stark reports that "some banks are
beginning to act like owners-demanding dividends from the KFTs [limited
liability companies] and RTs [joint stock companies] affiliated with state
enterprises."15
6
Second, economic institutions influence the impact of ownership incentives.
Consider the horizon problem. Should a manager invest to stimulate the bottom
line for the next quarter, or should the manager invest in research and development for the future'? The answer depends on the institutional relationships among
economic actors. In Germany, for instance, banks exercise ownership functions

The problem is that "[s]ince equity ownership in a public corporation is dissipated over a broad and
14.
ill-defined group of shareholders, the top managers together with their board of directors have 'power without
property."' Ellerman et aL., supra note 4, at 283. They also observe that "there are remarkable similarities
between the state and socially-owned firms of socialism and the public corporations of capitalism." Id.
See Stark, supranote 4. For a discussion of the increasingly complex nature of Hungarian ownership
15.
relations, especially the growing cross-holding among firms, private and state, see id. at 25-32 (section entitled
"Institutional Cross-Ownership in Hungary").
A discussion of the horizon problem broken down by ownership type appears in Jan Winiecki,
16.
TheoreticalArgumentsforPrivatization,3 COMMUNIST ECONOMIES AND ECON. TRANSFORMATION No. 4, at 399,
399-414 (1991).
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disproportionate to their actual equity holdings. Some analysts attribute the longterm horizon of German corporate planning to the oversight function of German
banks that have an interest in encouraging the long-term stable economic growth
of domestic firms. This also accounts for the efforts of German banks to block
foreign companies from obtaining equity in major German companies.
For more than a generation after World War II, capital markets in France and
Japan were not price driven; to an important extent, capital was allocated
administratively, less by price (as in the proposed capital markets for Eastern
Europe) than by a centralized system of priority allocative categories.17
In Japan, the most successful case of rapid development, ownership is of
course "private," but only if one defines "private" merely as meaning not owned
by the state. Interlocking shareholding and finance within keiretsu created
something far removed from the simple ownership model of the radical capitalists.
Keiretsu has no obvious analogy in the rest of the First World. Banks, trading
companies, and the state bureaucracy have strong incentives to monitor
management in the large Japanese companies. The long-term outlook characteristic of Japanese firms is widely attributed to structural interdependence of these
different institutions. Who owns Mitsubishi? Perhaps the most accurate functional
answer is "Mitsubishi owns Mitsubishi."
In the United States, on the other hand, owners of large chunks of corporate
stock are typically financial intermediaries like mutual funds or pension funds. 8
Since transaction costs are minimal in U.S. markets and the availability of investment options abounds, it is easier for holders of financial assets to exit (by selling
their interest) rather than exercise their voice (by trying to improve management).' 9 This system encourages U.S. management to produce a good bottom
line, and pay out high dividends to satisfy investors who are likely to have a short
time horizon, rather than invest in research and development, which may prove
more beneficial over the long haul.
Ownership structure is an important element in modern capitalism, but it is
only one of many factors that influence corporate behavior and performance. The
horizon problem highlights one of many aspects of those differences. Depending
upon the institutional context, private ownership takes substantially different
forms and functions. Ultimately, it has many different meanings. There is more
than one variety of capitalism.

17.
See STEPHEN S. COHEN Er AL., CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, CREDIT POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL
POLICY IN FRANCE, MONETARY POLICY, SELECTIVE CREDIT POLICY, AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN FRANCE,
BRITAIN, WEST GERMANY, AND SWEDEN; A STAFF STUDY PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC

COMMITTEE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GPO No. 77-744 0 (1981). See also JOHN ZYSMAN,
GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS, AND GROWTH (1983).
18.
Mutual funds or pension funds in the American context are very different animals from those mutual
funds envisioned in Eastern Europe, or in particular, in Poland.
19.
See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
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I. STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS: THE EASTERN EUROPEAN CASE

Just as it is dangerous to apply narrowly naive concepts of capitalist institutions to Eastern Europe, so it is dangerous to generalize about this region and
apply a single set of institutions and a single strategy across the different countries. Even a passing acquaintance with Eastern Europe reveals countries with different political systems, legal traditions, ownership patterns, educational levels,
industrial structures, languages, ethnic cleavages, religions, and population sizes.
Little wonder that of the four Eastern European countries most actively engaged
in privatization-the former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and
Slovenia--each had a different privatization strategy. Nonetheless, the demise
of Communism left a legacy common to each state: to wit, experience with the
plan and inefficient centralized state enterprises inexperienced with capitalist
institutions.2 This legacy constrains the prospects for rapid privatization in the
region.
There are at least eight interrelated sets of common problems certain to
complicate both privatization and the construction of effective institutions
throughout Eastern Europe.22 These problems are discussed in detail below.
A. Shortage of EntrepreneurialExperience
More than four decades of Communist rule in Eastern Europe have produced
a managerial class unequipped to produce for a capitalist market, not to speak of
the entrepreneurial effort implied by the complex restructuring necessary for
dynamic growth. Most of the market experience in the region comes from the
"Second Economy," and journalistic accounts of black market ingenuity aside, it
is dubious that such experience will translate into competent large company
owners or factory managers. Besides the petty black marketeers, the other likely
new ownership strata is going to be either those who made money illegally or
corrupt bureaucrats, or most likely both, working together as they always have. 2
They would be the ones to split up existing enterprises into their valuable and

20.
East Germany could be added to this list, but its incorporation into the German state distinguishes
it from the other cases.

21.

For instance, Poland plans a mass privatization scheme open to all citizens, entitling them to

ownership of shares of mutual funds. See Country privatization papers presented at the Second CEEPN Annual
Conference on Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe in Vienna, Austria (Nov. 29-30, 1991). The former
Czechoslovakia has embarked on a voucher scheme which entitles nationals to purchase vouchers in individual
firms or mutual funds. Id Hungary is using a mix of programs, most recently emphasizing the sale of enterprises
to financially sound investors based on review by private consultants. Id. Slovenia is intending to sell off its
industries to the highest bidder. Id.
This is, of course, only a partial listing. A more comprehensive roster of problems includes
22.
macroeconomic stabilization, the lack of administrative capability, ambiguous prior ownership structures, and
environmental problems.
ARKADY VAKSBERG, LA MAFIA RUSSE [T)rE SOVIET MAFIA] (1991) (translated from Russian).
23.
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potentially negative parts, shift excess labor across those parts, maintain their
control of the good portions, and benefit from a substantial capital gain at the
moment of privatization; millionaires, in one quick shot, no matter how well or
badly the enterprise would then perform. Furthermore, where assets would be
auctioned off to the highest bidder, only these networks of officials and plant
managers, with their underground allies, most often called "the Mafia," would
have the cash to bid. This potential was not lost on some of the more sophisticated foreign advisers: Bars in foreigners-only hotels were filled with IMF and
World Bank officials explaining how the late medieval capitalists in Europe were
considered, in their time, to be criminal elements. And look at the winners of the
U.S. bootlegging wars; they have now become solid, corporate capitalists. The
belief was that as it invariably did in the United States, privatization and
legalization would eventually transform the Eastern European criminal mafias into
legitimate organizations-unless, of course, the southern Italian model reasserted
itself.
B. Shortage of Companies Ready for a Market Economy
Many enterprises are burdened with obsolete technology and a poorly trained
workforce.24 Other enterprises are encumbered by staggering amounts of debt.
Much of the borrowing resulted from irresponsible management of state finances
rather than company mismanagement. State enterprises were a convenient
receptacle to stash government debt.' Recognizing the nonviability of many
large enterprises, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland decided to implement
privatization slowly.2 6 Even the Treuhandanstalt (Treuhand), the holding
institution set up by the German government to sell off and restructure assets in
eastern Germany, has privatized only about half of the eastern German industries,
despite a DM 100 billion infusion of capital from western Germany;27 about 1.6
million workers remain employed under Treuhand jurisdiction.2' Despite its
ferocious determination to the contrary, it would not be surprising if the Treuhand
found itself slowly transformed into a new German version of Italy's much

The problem may not be the quality of training, but the type of training. The specific skills of an
24.
Eastern worker must correspond with Western production methods. One manifestation of this problem is the
difficulty that very highly trained East Bloc mathematicians are having in getting jobs in the U.S. computer
industry. These specialists are highly experienced, yet not familiar with Western operating systems. As a result,
it is hard for them to get jobs; they need to be retrained-an expensive and time-consuming process for a
prospective employer.
See Jan Vanous, Near-Term Prospects for Economic Reform in Eastern Europe, Paper presented at
25.
the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics (Apr. 25-26, 1991).
26.
Johnson, supra note 2, table 12.
27.
Rudiger Dornbusch & Holger C. Wolff, Eastern German Reconstruction, Paper presented at the
Conference on Transition in Eastern Europe in Cambridge, Mass. (Feb. 26-29, 1992).
28.
Figures are as of December 31, 1991. FAcr SHEE (Treithandanstalt,N.Y.), Jan. 7, 1992. Nearly 5000
out of 10,500 businesses have been sold. Id.
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maligned Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI, the giant state holding
company).
C. Shortage of Domestic Capital
The previous regimes left the economies virtually without savings.2 9 The
rebuilding of the industrial capacity in the region will have to rely on only small
contributions from the accumulated savings of the domestic population. Newly
privatized firms will need to rely on debt financing from domestic banks or from
institutions based abroad. However, no Eastern European government has an
established banking system ready to make the necessary loan commitments.
Moreover, real and nominal rates are high and credit is generally very tight
throughout the region. Loans are very difficult to obtain.3" The major source of
capital is likely to remain the state, or in very select circumstances, foreigners.
The newly privatized firms, striving to become competitive, will not be the
only large claimant on the small capital pool. Indeed, they will most likely find
themselves on the tail end of the queue. The appalling inadequacy of basic infrastructure will force the state and the foreign donors to funnel scarce capital first
to road building, basic telecommunications (e.g., telephone installation), airlines,
railways, and the like, not to mention the special problems posed by electric
power generation-the handling of those dangerous, badly built nuclear power
plants on Europe's doorstep. These sectors, the kind typically operated as
regulated monopolies in the United States, are very likely to absorb the lion's
share of foreign aid and investment.
Electric generation is particularly pressing. The Western Europeans want those
power stations rebuilt for greater safety, and the European nuclear power industry
is hurting terribly from a dismal lack of new orders. This creates a nice
opportunity to combine safety in the West with the spread of capitalism to the
East and generate business for state supported firms in the West. Electric power
generation industries will surely receive massive foreign investments, especially
if they are privatized, with which they can purchase equipment and services from
the West.
Modernizing infrastructure is expensive. To get an idea of the potential costs,
consider German investment in the former East Germany. Germany invested $14
billion in new telecommunications systems and an additional $22 billion in road
construction and other transportation networks in the provinces of former East

There is also a problem with foreign debt, though amounts differ: as of January 1991, Poland, $11
29.
billion; Czechoslovakia, $6.7 billion; Hungary, $19.5 billion; and Yugoslavia (including Slovenia and Croatia),
$7.5 billion. COOPERS & LYBRANDT, DOING BusINEss IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION 80-81
(1991).
See Johnson, supra note 2.
30.
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Germany.3 In addition to these expenditures, Eastern European governments are
sure to be financially burdened from "meeting the interest and principal payments
on the foreign debt, funding the social safety net and retraining programs for the
workers becoming unemployed as a result of the restructuring of the economy,
financing the pensions and health careneeds of the ageing population, modernizing the educational system ... [and] paying for the needed environmental
cleanups and safeguards."32
The classic infrastructural industries are also the best candidates for privatization. They could produce tradable shares to generate capital markets. They would
also be acceptable vehicles for international aid and investment, especially
European Bank for Reconstruction Development (EBRD) assistance, tied as they
are to a substantial portion of private sector lending.33 Infrastructural industries
are the easiest to manage; they do not have to compete. They can be made to
generate correct returns. All in all, they present an ideal set of privatizable activities completely protected from the vicissitudes of markets and competition. Infrastructural industries will remain regulated and thereby generate few of the
capitalist virtues that exemplify the purpose of privatization.
Finally, those who expect a major capital injection from the West are likely
to be disappointed. 34 For one thing, the recession and the high government
deficits run by Western governments have drained the coffers of prospective
donors. For another, there are many alternative investment opportunities for scarce
Western capital in eastern Asia, Latin America, and even in eastern Germany and
the former Soviet Union.
The amount of foreign investment flowing into the region has been
disappointing. For example, in 1990 and 1991, Poland received $1.3 billion;
Czechoslovakia, $0.8 billion; and Hungary, $2.3 billion.35 Over the same period,
former East Germany received over DM 100 billion in total transfers from
western Germany. Western governments have not been overly forthcoming either.
For instance, total World Bank commitments to the region for 1991 only
amounted to a little over $3 billion. 36 The EBRD devoted only about $800
million, of which $377 million was for telecommunications loans.3 7 Prospects

31.
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EBRD's Rolf B. Westling, TRANSITOIN, Apr. 1992, at 7.
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34.
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5, 1992, at Al, Al, D8.
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for future foreign investment in the area remain guarded, though the share
contributed by international organizations is slated to increase.
D. Business ConditionsAre Very Risky
Marko Simonetti, director of privatization for Slovenia, argues that the challenge of privatization is to find active owners willing to lead companies through
the transition period.38 But this is easier said than done. After all, why should
new owners restructure their enterprises when there may be an immediate payoff
if they liquidate the assets? In most cases they should not, especially if foreign
competition is allowed. Domestic producers will not be able to compete
effectively in world markets, especially against the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NC). A brief taste of what lies ahead is the case of large state
enterprises in eastern Germany; unable to compete abroad, these firms lost their
home market when companies from the western part of the country moved in.39
The temptation to liquidate rather than to invest is heightened by the asset
value of many companies. The company's land, buildings, and the right to do
business may be worth more in the marketplace than its productive potential,
which lies in often dubious and difficult assets like machinery or the labor force.
A common story is that of CKD Tatra-until recently, the world's largest maker
of tram cars, but today a manufacturer of only 300-which has attracted
investment interest partly because the site of its old factory "occupies acres of
prime real estate, a hop, skip, and two subway stops from ... Wenceslaus
Square."' Prospective investors in this firm would have little incentive to
restructure this outmoded tram works when they could easily profit by closing the
factory and selling or developing the land.
The state needs to be very careful in establishing market rules and regulations
that encourage productive investment and discourage passive holdings.4 There
is a fine line between an entrepreneur who is innovative and one who is rentseeking. Consider the role of incentives in the experience of successful Slovene
exporters in the mid-1980s. These firms were the largest earners of hard foreign
currency in the area because their products sold well abroad. Ordinarily, one
might expect that the exporters would reinvest the profits in expanding its core
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See Marko Simonetti, Review of Jeffrey D. Sachs' AcceleratingPrivatizationin Eastern Europe:The
Case of Poland, Presented at the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics (Apr. 25-26,
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Peter Passell, Czech StreetcarsNone Desire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992, at C2.
40.
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businesses, perhaps with aggressive marketing or by upgrading quality. Yet, as
of 1991, the Yugoslav dinar was greatly overvalued. So, like any resourceful
Western tourist who happens to be carrying hard currency into a country where
the home currency is overvalued, the Slovene exporters exchanged the hard
currency earnings with black marketeers. In fact, the trading was so successful
that the exporters decided to go into the currency trading business themselves,
plowing their foreign exchange earnings into trading rather than reinvesting in the
productive export business.4 2 The result: a classic horizon problem. Hungary
proposed to discourage rent-seeking by restricting speculation on farmland
acquired through reprivatization. 4u
E. Lack of HistoricalCooperative Links Between Labor, Suppliers,
Manufacturers,and Consumers
First World countries like Japan and Germany were able to get back on their
feet quickly after World War II partly because reconstruction meant the
reconstitution of forms of economic organization established years earlier, rather
than the creation of completely new relationships. For instance, keiretsu, the
centralized forms of ownership in Japan, were antedated by zaibatsu which
originated in the Meiji era.44 German business and unions reached durable
working arrangements long before the postwar German miracle. The antecedent
for the workers councils, a keystone of modem German corporatism, was
established during World War I when military imperatives prompted governmental
accommodation with labor.45 Throughout Scandinavia and Western Europe,
institutional networks among business, labor, and government that facilitate
domestic peace and economic growth evolved over a 100-year period. 46 These
relationships will not occur overnight in Eastern Europe.
F. Poor Work Habits
One element of the Leninist legacy is evidently a workforce that does not
want to work. This report from the New York Times is commonplace: "Managers
of new private companies say they must dismiss dozens of people to find one not
afflicted by the lackadaisical work ethic fostered by the Communist system.
Private hotels in Warsaw do not even accept applications from former state
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employees."'47 Another element is the hierarchical mentality that still pervades
Eastern European enterprises. In the past, the incentive structures in Communist
enterprises discouraged managers from acting with initiative. In most cases,
managers, especially middle-level managers, were better off merely to play along
with the system rather than risk their position by exercising discretion. 8 This is
hardly a prescription for entrepreneurial dynamism.
G. Ethnic Divisions
Many countries in Eastern Europe are fractured by ethnic cleavages, language
differences, and religions. In many cases these differences have not been
politically or economically resolved.49 Divisions between Czechs and Slovaks,
Croats and Serbs, and Hungarians and Romanians are likely to complicate
effective economic policy making. The situation in the former Czechoslovakia
illustrates the difficulties brought about by ethnic haggling. Populist separatist
movements in Slovakia are clashing with reform-minded Czechs like Klaus,
which has the potential of paralyzing economic reform. Perhaps an even more
poignant example is the former Yugoslovia, where civil war has relegated
economic reform to the back burner.
H. Small National Markets and Broken InternationalLinkages
The long-run economic choices of Eastern European countries will be
restricted by the small size of national markets in the region. The countries are
mostly both small and poor. To achieve competitive viability, industries in small
countries must be active participants in foreign markets. By the same token, it is
much cheaper for these exporting firms and domestic consumers to obtain imports
on the international market, rather than have these same goods produced
inefficiently at home."' Ideally, industries in small countries operate in a very
open international market; source where value is best and sell internationally in
niches. They must be outward looking and very dynamic-exactly the opposite
of Eastern European large enterprises.
To approach this norm in the Eastern European case, industrial restructuring
will be necessary on a massive scale. But such restructuring means the closing of

Engelberg, supra note 9, at Al.
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many, probably most, large enterprises and the loss of several thousand jobs.
Isolated from the world market, large firms in Eastern European countries
produced goods made better and cheaper abroad. They operated in captive
markets and they exported on a large scale to similarly noncompetitive foreign
markets within the realm of the planned economies. They learned to operate with
constant output and input prices and virtually unlimited access to credit. Sooner
or later many of those companies must be eliminated as national resources are
channeled into products where the Eastern European countries are likely to have
a competitive advantage, not just compared to one another, but compared to the
entire world. As one big firm in the region tries to improve itself by sourcing
quality components from the world market, it dries up the markets for the other
large firms, its traditional suppliers. When local consumers get a little real money
and the choice to buy coveted imported goods rather than generally lower quality
local products, the entire system collapses.
The industrial structures of Eastern Europe were created with important
linkages to the regions of the former Soviet Union. These networks of customers
and suppliers are now completely severed. As a result, Eastern European
companies have lost the only conceivable buyers for what they produce and the
cheap suppliers of what they need in order to produce. The problem is not simply
one of efficiency as revealed in price; it is one of political borders and disruption.
Even a substantial increase in efficiency will not make up for the tattered regional
industrial structure. It takes years to build a new structure, and a new structure
cannot be built until the political uncertainty is overcome. Private investment-obtained in a real capital market-will not be easily forthcoming in newly
privatized companies that are unsure of where their markets lie, where their
sources of supply are located, or who their competitors are. Additionally, the new
international industrial structure of Eastern Europe will not be built quickly. For
the future of capitalism in the region it is the most important construction. The
desired gains in efficiency will not be realized, and even if somehow they could
be realized, they will not compensate for the loss of established interindustry
linkages, economies of scale and economies of certainty.
The situation is something akin to what happened after the Treaty of
Versailles redrew the map of eastern Europe at the end of World War I. Borders
and impenetrable political and economic obstacles separated firms from their
traditional customers and suppliers. Activity came to a halt and thousands of
people were thrown out of work. After World War I, it took over ten years for
eastern Europe to return to 1913 levels of industrial production.52
These eight obstacles would deter the most ardent reformers from attempting
a program of drastic and potentially all-or-nothing industrial change. But they will
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not deter the radical capitalists. In their view, the private ownership of large
enterprises will put the Eastern European economies on a solid footing-in time.
According to the radical capitalists, it is precisely because of the problems
confronting the region that it is essential to install private ownership quickly.
The radical capitalists' prescription for Eastern Europe might be tenable given
a stable institutional setting with a functioning tax code, established financial
system, legal system, broad-based capital markets, and credible political guarantees, as well as plausibly operating networks of international markets and industrial linkages. However, there are few credible, tested institutions. Without them,
rapid privatization will not provide a solid base for prosperity, nor will it aid the
growth of an active independent entrepreneurial class.
The next section considers the likely consequences of rapid privatization in
the absence of just one institution: viable financial broad-based capital markets.
We select capital markets because, evidently, it is the institution most dear to the
radical capitalists, and it plays an important symbolic role in the popular
imagination. But any of the others would do just as well; indeed, capital markets
are probably easier to create than, for example, the honest and extremely
competent public regulatory bodies that will be necessary for rapid privatization
to succeed, or even for capital markets to function positively.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS: THE CRUCIAL
ROLE OF CAPITAL MARKETS

Capital markets remove power, in giant dollops, from the hands of entrenched
bureaucracies. They are fast and powerful. They move mountains and provide
invisibility for the movers: It is difficult for a public bureaucracy to close down
the only industry in a midwestem U.S. town, that now-familiar objective is more
easily achieved by a twitch on the Tokyo or New York stock exchanges. Capital
markets are also a major entertainment industry in their own right, something of
a cross between the tables of sporting results that fill so many pages of newsprint
and minutes of air time daily, and Hollywood gossip stories that fill much of the
rest of most information media. In these, and many other ways, broad-based
capital markets are wonderful creations.
In capitalist economies, broad-based equity markets serve both investors and
corporations alike in two general ways. First, equity markets signal the underlying
value of securities. Theoretically, this facilitates the proper allocation of resources
by providing both investors and companies opportunities to raise cash as well as
to spread resources among businesses that vary by product line and investment
risk. Accurate share valuations also provide stockholders with a de facto
evaluation of management, which may sometimes precipitate corrective action.
Second, equity markets provide venues for companies to raise capital (equity or
debt) over a wide net of investors. By the same token, equity markets enable
investors to control more easily risk in their portfolio. Finally, equity markets ease
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the costs of investment and corporate restructuring by providing liquidity to both
investors and corporations alike.53
But price-driven, broad-based, open capital markets are not a sine qua non for
successful "capitalist" development. As noted above, two of the most successful
of the capitalist nations, France and Japan, relied on financial systems that did not
allocate capital in an open market simply or essentially by price during almost
two generations of rapid postwar growth and modernization. Both successfully
used centralized systems of priority allocationi5 Korea is a more recent example
of spectacular capitalist development with something other than a price-driven,
broad-based, open capital market.
Because they are so powerful, capital markets are dangerous, especially when
they lack proper safeguards and depth. In Eastern Europe, the hazards are
particularly acute because of the complete lack of experience in using these
markets. Additionally, capital markets are likely to attract more attention than
usual because of their novelty in the region and their significance as a capitalist
symbol. To simplify matters, the following discussion concentrates on one type
of financial capital market: broad-based equity or stock markets.
Radical capitalists assume, correctly in the authors' view, that capital markets
will arise concurrently with privatization and the issuance of shares. The process
is already underway. Despite few viable companies, public stock markets are
55
being organized throughout Eastern Europe.
Unfortunately, in spite of the best of intentions, Eastern European equity
markets probably will not be able to perform efficiently and may perform with
delegitimating perversity.56 It will be virtually impossible to establish fair market
value for the exchange's listed companies given the shortage of capital in the
region and the unstable business conditions. The lack of well-established, highly
capitalized market participants forebodes a lack of liquidity in the equity markets.
This will produce equity markets with thin market conditions and wild price
swings, since insufficient numbers of large investors will exist to support prices.
The inexperience of the domestic traders may also increase the likelihood of
intermittent price plunges. Investors are likely to see the values of their portfolios
fluctuate wildly. Many will lose their investment, and with it faith in the market.
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Rather than resemble the efficient, "thick" markets of the West, like the New
York Stock Exchange, Eastern European equity markets are likely to have more
in common with the freewheeling stock markets of the Third World.57
Corruption is sure to become a big problem. Inexperienced Eastern European
market regulators will not be able to police markets that are moving quickly, and
without apparent reason. Market rigging and stock manipulation are inevitable.
Even in the most sophisticated trading environments, flagrant abuses are
commonplace. The charges run the gamut from stock manipulation and inside
information to kickbacks and money laundering with organized crime. For
instance, in Japan, ".. . the former top executives of Nomura Securities and
Nikko Securities-the largest and third largest brokerage houses in Japan-testified before Parliament that their firms had for years done business with
an organized-crime figure, helping finance what may have been a huge stock
manipulation scheme." In the United States, the popularity of junk bonds and the
dishonesty of unscrupulous salesmen like Michael Milken and Charles Keating
helped produce the savings and loan debacle and the fall of Drexel, Burnham &
Lambert, a large investment house. Even the U.S. treasury auction proved
vulnerable to corruption. In a U.S. Treasury publication in 1991, Salomon
Brothers admitted to cornering the market. As the most experienced traders will
attest, market operations are very complex, and enforcing fair rules can be nearly
impossible.
How will inexperienced Eastern European regulators be able to protect
investors and enforce the market rules when information is scarce and
maldistributed, markets are thin, prices are fluctuating wildly, and markets are
dominated by only a few players? The answer: They won't be able to. Investors
are sure to think they are being cheated, and most often they will be right. This
potential for delegitimizing the entire effort to create a functioning market system,
even more than any perverse effects the wild new capital markets may have on
the optimality of capital allocation, is the primary danger. The first rounds of
stock market activity are sure to see managers and their invisible partners in the
administration cash in big. A crop of instant millionaires, whom everyone knew
as the old nomenklatura,will become conspicuous symbols to be manipulated by
potential demagogues. Eastern Europe may soon have truly "Far West" financial
markets, but Eastern Europe is not the Far West; it lacks the vast safety valves
and alternative opportunities of that place and time.
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If the resentment against black marketeers in Eastern Europe is any indication,
there will be a groundswell against the "excessive" greed and corruption in the
equity markets." Legitimate operators could get caught up in the popular
outrage, so might the whole reform movement, especially in the context of largescale economic misery and uncertainty experienced by what some tend to refer
to as "honest, hard working native people." The reaction is likely to be exacerbated as domestic restructuring gathers steam and many workers lose their jobs.
Eastern Europeans may soon give literal meaning to the attitude of Yoshihiko
Miyauchi, president of Japan-based Orix Corporation: "Too many Japanese made
money without sweating in the 1980s, which
I personally think is unethical ....
59
I think we have to kill this sentiment.
Until a viable equity- market is operational, companies are likely to go
elsewhere to raise capital or sell assets-they will privately place equity or raise
capital through debt rather than equity.' In the West, market valuations can be
arrived at fairly quickly due to the relatively free flow of information and the
efficiency of markets. In the East, however, market valuations will be much more
problematic. This problem will be exacerbated by the lack of accepted accounting
standards and a credible tax system. These added uncertainties will make it much
tougher to raise capital. Under these conditions, Eastern European firms will have
no choice but to rely on the state, or in special cases private banks or foreigners,
for their capital requirements. The investment policy of the newly privatized
enterprise is likely to become dependent on the state. Independent active
ownership may become an illusion, even given a plan of rapid privatization.
V. PUBLIC ENTERPRISES RECONSIDERED
Radical capitalists insist that state ownership and capitalism do not mix, nor
do state ownership and rapid development. In their view, the Communist
economic malaise is just another failure of state ownership. Throughout the world,
they argue, state-owned industries are notoriously inefficient and corrupt. In the
Third World, where the state is a major asset holder, the record of state-owned
industries is particularly appalling. There is little wonder that many poor nations,
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as diverse as India, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Mexico, have embarked on massive
privatization programs in recent years.6 '
However, state ownership makes sense at certain times such as when markets
are imperfect. In Eastern Europe, as in the Third World, there are few private
alternatives. Entrepreneurial experience, sufficient capital, developed markets, and
modem infrastructure are typically in short supply. 62 Under these conditions,
sustained private investment is very difficult to obtain, especially from foreigners.
Capital shortages are already evident in Eastern Europe. Eastern European
medium-sized firms are finding it tough to get fresh foreign capital because of the
so-called "play-safe attitude of Western banks." This means that industries which
may hold long-term economic potential or whose development may be in the
national interest will never get off the ground. The state must step into the breach.
Finally, and most prominently, there is the repeated history in country after
country where a sudden implosion of whole sectors results in the state being
forced to step in and nationalize the losers. Hence the typical state sector arises,
with its portfolio of coal mines, steel mills, railways, and shipbuilding docks. Italy
and Spain have lavish government portfolios so acquired. This history of
nationalizing dying industries in response to political pressures, or more simply
of managing the difficult task of restructuring and downsizing as painlessly as
possible, has given state-owned enterprises their bad name. They are, most often,
collections of basket cases that no one else would take. This makes their
experience particularly relevant to Eastern European big business.
There are, however, examples of state-owned companies, nationalized for one
reason or another, that were not already dying. France provides the best examples.
Here, the history of the companies' performance has been anything but negative.
As late as thirty years after World War II, the French state still owned all major
firms in steel; coal; oil distribution and refining; transportation and exploration;
automobiles, trucks, and buses; rockets; cigarettes; electronics; ocean shipping;
aircraft and airlines; skyscraper office development; radar; radio and television
broadcasting; telephone equipment and services; gas and electricity; and in
addition, horrid as it may seem, most big banks and insurance companies. And
this is but a partial list. The postwar modernization, restructuring, and growth of
the French economy has been extraordinarily successful. In addition, state-owned
firms played a leading role, not simply a shock-absorbing role, in that transformation and modernization.63
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In Japan and Korea, the giant industrial groupings that dominate the economy
defy simple classification as either private or public. Nor is there any compelling
reason to make the distinction. Surely the great Japanese keiretsu are not public
firms; the government does not own them. But it is extremely difficult to assimilate the Sumitomo or Mitsubishi groups into the traditional category of private
firms. The market is not the opposite of the government; the firm is not in
opposition to the State. There are many varieties of institutional arrangements, and
they change with time and circumstance. The all-or-nothing, public bureaucracy,
or private (capital-market based) firm model is dangerously simplistic. It pops out

of textbook economics, not out of the history of successful economic development, especially "catch-up" development. And that, after all, is the relevant genre
for Eastern Europe. The peoples of Eastern Europe do not have to invent their

future, just catch up with it.
What determines the success of state-owned enterprises? It is not just ownership. State-operated industries can be operated efficiently or inefficiently, using
technologically advanced production techniques or backward ones. Empirically,
the answer is clear. Good performance is a function of the domestic political
economy, not just the fact of state ownership. 64 Christianson 65 and VernonWortzel and Wortzel observed6 that privatization without liberalization produced
few gains. In a survey of state enterprises in Asia, Chamnong noted that management rather than ownership was often a better guide to performance.67 One of
the authors reached similar conclusions for France.68 Raymond Vernon in The
Promise of Privatization,a cross-national collection of case studies of privatization, drew the following conclusion:
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personal computers of the 1980s. In the United Kingdom, privatization of the telecommunications industry
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[T]he glaring cases [of differential performance between state-owned and
privately owned industry], however, have revealed much more about the
basic character of the government involved than the efficiency potential
of state-owned enterprises. Where governments have been reasonably
competent and responsible, and where comparisons between private
enterprises and state-owned enterprises has not appeared much different
than private enterprise. Here, and there a strikingly efficient performance
by a state owned enterprise has cast doubt on the simple stereotypes of
the public enterprise as a perennial wastrel.69
What these examples suggest is that reliance on the public sector, and public
ownership in particular, may actually be good strategy. State ownership is
certainly not to be sought as an end in itself; nor, for that matter, is private
ownership of large enterprises. It all depends upon the context in which choices
must be made. Where private ownership seems doomed to fail-as in the case of
many large enterprises in Eastern Europe-the failure will result in a sudden
implosion of the economy and society. In these cases, alternatives to simple
privatization should be sought. After all, even mighty Western Europe did not
turn over its inefficient, traditional industries to the tender mercies of the market.
Steel, coal, rails, telecommunications, and agriculture were nurtured for years in
various ways by the state, which calculated that the costs of sudden collapse and
disruption exceeded the costs of inefficiency. State ownership has absolutely no
a priori claim as the most efficient choice, but neither does it, by itself, doom
industrial growth. Sometimes, such as in unkind times, state ownership may be
a good second best alternative; it may help enable enterprises to "buy time" to
catch up with more technologically advanced competitors. Moreover, the recent
surge of privatization throughout Europe, Japan, and the Third World indicates
that state ownership need not be a permanent phenomenon. Those trying to design
new systems for Eastern Europe might profitably sift the rich varieties of
institutional experience of other countries to glean what lead to better or worse
performance: from state-owned, state-regulated, state-controlled, or the state-incahoots-with the company models. Ownership is a complex concept, contingent
on embedded institutions. And, given current conditions for big industry in
Eastern Europe, state ownership may be more desirable than simple "private
ownership." The conclusion argues that the logic of privatization in Eastern
Europe does not ensure a dynamic market economy dominated by private firms.
It is more likely that rapid privatization will precipitate state reintervention sooner
or later.
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE FAULTY INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC
OF RAPID PRIVATIZATION

The focus on privatization, especially rapid privatization, diverts attention
from the implementation of policies and the creation of market firms and institutions that encourage the development of competitive industries and an effective
state bureaucracy. More important than the expected benefits of increased efficiency in its big firms as a result of privatization, Eastern Europe needs to rebuild
the networks of industrial linkages and trade within the region. It needs outlets
for its goods-especially agriculture to Western Europe. It will need import
controls so that all savings will not wash out quickly in a wave of consumer
buying. And it needs a competent and honest public administration to re-create
those international linkages, administer those controls, negotiate trade agreements,
regulate the new and wildly imperfect markets, and buffer the vast shocks of fundamental industrial restructuring.
To the radical capitalists, rapid privatization is a shortcut. Eliminate the state,
and voilh, economic growth. But this belief is a myth. The state will not wither
away, despite the dreams of the radical capitalists, any more than it did in the
dreams of Karl Marx. The state will run things for a long time, if not as owner,
then as regulator.
Ironically, the logic of rapid privatization does not make the dependence of
industry on the state any less likely. The state is destined to be the key player in
the economy for the foreseeable future, whether privatization is rapid or gradual.
The newly privatized enterprises will depend on the state for financing, but they
will also need the state's political goodwill for establishing favorable rules and
regulations. Moreover, an interventionist state is mandatory as enterprises struggle
with the process of creating firms that can survive under a market system. The
state will also maintain a heavy hand in the industrial core of the economy
because, in Eastern Europe, the inherited industrial structure provides most
industries with too few firms for successful self-regulation by competition.
Moreover, regulation by foreign competition may prove fatal.
Just as substantial state involvement in the economy is inevitable, given rapid
privatization, so is protectionism. Newly privatized enterprises unfit for foreign
competition are likely to press for protectionist measures, especially since an open
domestic economy would be suicidal for local producers. Free competition would
open the field for Japan, the NICs, and other low-cost, high-quality producers and
would leave little chance for inefficient domestic producers. They are inefficient
now, and by world standards, they will be inefficient and uncompetitive for the
foreseeable future. One must recall that Japan, Korea, France, and Germany did
not expose their "infant industries" to the rigors of foreign competition; neither
will Eastern Europe.
Finally, rapid privatization plans are not necessarily conducive to narrow,
active and independent ownership. Some rapid privatization plans envision owner-
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ship through mutual funds or through national distribution of share vouchers. In
either case, there is no guarantee that active, independent ownership pressing for
dynamic restructuring will emerge. Mutual funds owning shares in many firms,
as in the Polish plan, may react to poor performance by selling shares, not necessarily by restructuring industry. If they do not, or are not allowed to, they
become, de facto, more like Italy's IRI than a Wall Street fund. More importantly,
the mutual funds (even with foreign advisors) are likely to advocate conservative
measures for change because of the dependence of enterprises on the state, and
perhaps ultimately on the workers. Also, it is not obvious why widely dispersed
ownership, as in the Czechoslovak plan, will pressure enterprises to restructure.
The new small shareholders are more likely to remain passive, perhaps feeling
cheated in their investments, as enterprises fail while some insiders get rich.7"
In any event, most big, inefficient enterprises will remain in state hands, directly
or indirectly, for the time being.
Grand designs are associated with great risks; so it was with Communism, so
it will be with liberal capitalism. But the risks associated with rapid privatization
skew the odds toward failure and ultimately toward disenchantment with
capitalism and a democratic, more liberal state. Why take the risk? We don't see
a 'good reason. The big, inefficient enterprises will not succeed as private
enterprises. But they cannot simply be abolished. In order to get a functioning
market system up and running in Eastern Europe, it will be necessary to keep the
state involved in the economy, if for no other purpose than to preserve a space
to maneuver and take positive action. The structures of capitalism, the institutions
of a functioning market system, must be built. That will take time, and breathing
room. Radically pure markets will not build them; they will destroy those structures and risk ending the capitalist experiment before it has had a chance to
develop into something worthwhile. After all, it was Joseph Schumpeter, the great
advocate of entrepreneurial capitalism, in his brilliant case for maintaining less
than perfect markets, who remarked, "You put brakes on a car so that it can go
faster, not slower."'"
The radical capitalist fallacy is that gradualism will ultimately result in the
loss of grand vision as local interests forestall change. Their concern is valid, but
their prescription is not. Quite the reverse, in fact, is true. Rapidly privatizing
inefficient enterprises will increase long-term dependence on the state, while
deliberate restructuring will set the stage for firms to embark on their own. Both
experience and logic argue that intermediate forms of ownership, sometimes
involving the state, may be instrumental in a country's growth. Nonetheless, over
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the short-term there is no choice-the state will be the key player in the economy.
It is the state that will make the crucial economic decisions. Rapid privatization
of big, inefficient enterprises is not so much the wrong answer as the wrong question. Too much attention, too much energy, and far too much political capital is
being devoted to their privatization and not enough to more pressing, but less
glamorous issues like enterprise restructuring, the creation of credible legal or tax
systems, the rebuilding of a regional network of industrial and market linkages,
and the creation of a functioning, reliable state administration. These are the key
pieces. Future accounts of economic change in Eastern Europe are likely to characterize big enterprise privatization as myth, or perhaps more accurately, as fad.

